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Abstract
The Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX)
has been developed to provide reliable data exchange with
strong data transmission time guarantees in internal com-
munication of the aircraft. The AFDX design is based on the
principle of a switched network with physically redundant
links to support availability and be tolerant to transmission
and link failures in the network.
In this work, we develop a formal model of the AFDX
frame management to ascertain the reliability properties
of the design. To capture the precise temporal semantics,
we model the system as a network of timed automata and
use UPPAAL to model-check for the desired properties ex-
pressed in CTL. Our analysis indicates that the design of
the AFDX frame management is vulnerable to faults such
as network babbling which can trigger unwarranted system
resets. We show that these problems can be alleviated by
modifying the original design to include a priority queue at
the receiver for storing the frames. We also suggest commu-
nicating redundant copies of the reset message to achieve
tolerance to network babbling.
1 Introduction
Control systems in general and avionics systems in par-
ticular, rely on complete and up to date data delivered from
the source to receiver in a timely fashion. For safety-
critical systems, reliable real-time communication links are
essential. The Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet
(AFDX) [3], has been developed to meet these require-
ments for commercial aircraft applications. The AFDX is
∗This research was supported in part by NSF CCR-0209024 and ARO
DAAD19-01-1-0473.
a subset of the profiled version of IEEE 802.3 standard Eth-
ernet [9], with key enhancements to provide deterministic
timing and reliable delivery of messages. Deterministic tim-
ing is achieved through communication over virtual links
(VL) that have a bounded bandwidth and frame delivery in-
terval. Communication over redundant channels is used to
achieve reliable delivery of the messages. A frame man-
agement mechanism is responsible for checking integrity of
message frames and managing the redundancy before deliv-
ering the messages to the application. Therefore, the frame
management forms an important component of the AFDX
design and has to be guaranteed against design flaws.
In this work, we develop a formal model of the AFDX
frame management, analyze and verify whether it meets the
requirement specification under different kinds of network
faults. In developing a formal model of the frame man-
agement, we use timed automata [1] that can quantitatively
capture the temporal information. Our specific model con-
sists of a network of timed automata with a transmitting
end system, two communication channels and a receiving
end system. The system is described in UPPAAL [5] which
supports model-checking properties specified in CTL. From
our analysis, the design was found to be vulnerable to faults
like network babble which led to unwarranted resets and
dropped frames if they arrived out-of-order. To fully uti-
lize the redundancy in messages and use this redundancy to
detect faults, we propose including a priority queue at the
receiver. This will help detect network babble on a chan-
nel, and deliver frames in sequence to the application even
if they arrive out-of-order. To reduce the probability of erro-
neous resets, we suggest communicating redundant copies
of the reset message. These modifications can easily be in-
corporated into the original design and provide increased
reliability to the AFDX frame management.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
1
tion 3 introduces the AFDX and the frame management,
Section 4 describes the timed automata model of the sys-
tem, Section 5 presents the analysis and results. Finally,
we present the modifications in Section 6 and conclude in
Section 7.
2 Previous Work
The ARINC-664 [2] is a commercial standard for the
avionics communication architecture. The AFDX [3] is a
vendor specific implementation of this standard. It is based
on the 802.3 standard Ethernet with enhancements to en-
sure determinism and reliability. An overview of a switched
Ethernet avionics network along with testing challenges are
identified in [10]. While their work concentrates on hard-
ware testing of various modules through simulation, our fo-
cus here, is to formally model and analyze the design under
different faults. Our model was developed using UPPAAL,
a freely available tool that allows modeling with a flavor
of timed automata, called the Timed Safety Automata [7].
The modeling language in UPPAAL builds on the timed
automata model, providing useful extensions like integer
variables, broadcast channels, urgent and committed loca-
tions, etc. The model-checker in UPPAAL allows specify-
ing queries using a simplified version of CTL, where the
query language consists of path and state formula, but the
path formulae cannot be nested. A significant body of lit-
erature exists on modeling and verification of protocols in
UPPAAL(c.f., [6, 8, 12]).
3 AFDX and the Frame Management
The main elements of the AFDX network are end-
systems, switches, and links. The function of the End-
system (ES) is to provide services, which guarantee a se-
cure and reliable data exchange to the partition software.
Each end-system has a direct, bidirectional connection to a
switch. There may be multiple such connections to be used
for redundant communication. The switched network en-
sures that the connection and bandwidth required to move
data from one end-system to another is available. Quality
of Service (QoS) provides a method for categorizing traffic
and for ensuring that particular categories of traffic will al-
ways flow across the network at the service level to which
they are entitled, regardless of competing demands. For the
aircraft network, each network transmission request must
be serviced regardless of the data type and a maximum net-
work transit delay, called end-to-end latency(L), must be
guaranteed. A guaranteed service provides a firm, mathe-
matically provable, upper bound on end-to-end latency.
The Virtual Link(VL) is the basis of the Ethernet proto-
col. Each VL defines an unidirectional connection from one
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Figure 1. Network Redundancy Concept
source end-system to potentially multiple destination end-
systems through which data frames are exchanged. The data
flow on the links is controlled by the end-system in accor-
dance with a Bandwidth Allocation GAP(BAG). The BAG
values are time slices allocated by and end-system to trans-
mit data for a VL. These times are defined in milliseconds
and are typically powers of two.s
Reliable frame delivery in the AFDX design is ensured
by utilizing redundant links. This basic idea of network re-
dundancy is shown in Figure 3. End-systems communicate
over multiple communication channels with the effect that
communication is protected against loss of one complete
network.
The redundancy scheme operates on a per link basis in
the following manner: A transmitting end-system prepares
some data and passes it to the communications protocol
stack. Here, a sequence number field is added to each frame
to enable the receive function to reconstruct a single ordered
stream of frames without duplication before delivery to the
receiving partition. The sequence numbers are one octet
long with a range from 0 to 255 and are incremented on
each successive frame. After 255, the sequence number is
wrapped around to 1. The sequence number 0 is reserved
for communicating resets. In this way the partition is un-
aware of the underlying network redundancy, and a sim-
ple interface can be built between the communications stack
and partitions that utilize the network service.
In the default mode, each frame is sent across both of
the networks and the redundancy is taken care at the receiv-
ing end-system. In order to simplify the algorithm at the
receiving end-system, redundant copies of a frame should
be sent within a maximum time difference of 0.5 ms. Upon
reception, an algorithm in the communications stack (below
IP layer) uses a “First Valid Wins” policy. This means that
the first frame to be received from either network with the
next valid sequence number is accepted and passed up the
stack to the receiving partition. When the second frame is
received with this sequence number, it is simply discarded.
As the flow of frames given in Figure 3 below indicates,
Redundancy Management (RM) is placed after the Integrity
Checking (IC).
Under fault-free network operation, the IC simply passes
the frames that it has received on to the RM, independently
for each network. If there are faults (based on sequence
number), the IC has the task of eliminating invalid frames,
and informs the network management accordingly. For each
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Figure 2. Network Redundancy Concept
network the IC tests each frame for a sequence number in
the interval: [PSN ⊕ 1, PSN ⊕ 2] where Previous Se-
quence Number (PSN) is the sequence number of the previ-
ous frame received (but not necessarily forwarded) on this
VL. The operator ⊕ takes the wrap-around of sequence
numbers into account. So, for example if PSN = 254,
then PSN ⊕ 1 = 255 and PSN ⊕ 2 = 1.
The function of the AFDX redundancy management is
merely to eliminate frames that are redundant copies of
frames that it has already passed on to the partition.The RM
assumes that the network is working properly and, in par-
ticular, the deterministic properties are verified. RM con-
figuration is generally based on the SkewMax parameter:
i.e. the maximum time between the reception of two redun-
dant frames. This value depends on the network topology
(number of switches crossed by the frames) and should be
provided by the system integrator. The SkewMax value
(expressed in ms) is given by configuration per VL.
4 System Model
We model the AFDX frame management, introduced in
the previous section as a network of timed automata. The
timed automata model allows us to quantitatively capture
the temporal aspects of the frame management such as max-
imum latency, skew and the BAG. The model was devel-
oped using UPPAAL.In our model, we have three principals
: The transmitting end-system, the channel, and the receiv-
ing end system. We will restrict ourselves to the case of two
redundant channels. However, extending the reasoning for
more redundant channels is fairly straightforward.
4.1 Transmitting End-system
The transmitting end-system sends the messages on the
redundant channels. The message (msg) is assumed to be
broken into frames (fr) that are then communicated across
the channels. The model for the transmitting system is given
in Figure 3. The initial state is Init from which the mes-
sages are sent on both the channels within 0.5ms of each
other. Since UPPAAL allows only integer constraints on
clock variables, in the model, we use c<1 to capture this
constraint.
The actual sending of the messages is captured via the
channels msg one and msg two. After the transmission,
the system waits till the end of the BAG to transit back to
the initial state. From the initial state, the system can non-
deterministically progress to the Reset state that captures
the reset of the transmitting end-system. If there is a reset,
then we wait for time HR before sending frame 0, indicat-
ing a reset, on both the channels. This reflects the time the
transmitting system takes to go though an hardware reset.
In the model, a boolean variable rchk is set whenever the
system is reset. This will help us to trace the execution of a
reset and also ascertain whether the receiving system resets
in response to a transmitter reset.
Init SentOne
c<1
SentTwo
c<=BAG
Reset
c:=0
msg_one!
msg_two!
c==BAG
tfr:=(tfr<255)?(tfr+1):1,rchk:=0
msg_one!
c:=0
c>=HR
tfr:=0,rchk:=1,c:=0
Figure 3. Timed Automata Model of the Trans-
mitting End-system
4.2 Network Channel
The network channel is responsible for transmitting
frames from the receiving end-system and deliver it to the
receiving end-system. The focus of our work here is to
model different kinds of network faults and view its impact
on the frame management. In this model, we consider two
kinds of network faults :
1. Transmission Related: Under this category, we con-
sider errors such as bit-errors, dropped packets, etc.
We model these errors as being non-deterministic and
independent. In practice, however, it is commonly
assumed that the probability of error in consecutive
frames is close to zero. Nevertheless, assuming the
errors to be independent keeps the model simple while
retaining its implications in practice.
2. Network Babble: The network can sometimes babble
i.e., deliver arbitrary frames to the receiver and we
model this fault in the network channel. Again, we
assume that the babbling is non-deterministic and in-
dependent of other faults.
Initially, the system is in the state Idle. Upon receiv-
ing the message msgr ( which could be either msg one
or msg two), it transits to the transmitting state. If the
transmission is successful, then, SendSuccessful state
is reached. The system can remain in this state for as long
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TransmittingSendSuccessful
cn<=max_latency
SendFailed
cn<=max_latency
Update
Babble
BabbleSend
no_error?
cn:=0
error?
cn:=0
rfr:=nfr, chk:=((nfr>prfr)&&(nfr-prfr<=2))||((nfr<prfr) && ( nfr-prfr+255<=2))?1:0
msgd!
prfr:=nfr
msgr?
frq[ub]:=tfr,ub:=(ub<4)?(ub+1):0
ub!=lb
nfr:=frq[lb],lb:=(lb<4)?(lb+1):0
tr!
msgr?
frq[ub]:=tfr,ub:=(ub<4)?(ub+1):0
nfr=tfr
msgr?
nfr:=rv1
msgr?
chk:=3
msgd!
Figure 4. Timed Automata Model of the Channel
as max latency and then the frame is delivered to the re-
ceiving end-system by passing through the Update state.
The delivery of the frame is signaled by msgd. If the
transmission fails, then SendFailed state is reached from
which the system returns to the initial state. Network bab-
bling is modeled in states Babble and BabbleSend dur-
ing which the network delivers random numbered frames
(rv1) to the receiving end-system.
We also implement a message frame queue in frq. In
the model, we consider the maximum length of this queue to
be 5. This allows the network and the transmitter to be inde-
pendent. Whenever the the transmitting end-system trans-
mits, the frame is queued and subsequently transmitted by
the network.
A variable chk is introduced to keep track of frame be-
ing delivered. If a valid frame is being delivered, then, it
takes a value 1 else it is assigned 0. If the frame being de-
livered is a result of babbling, then chk is assigned 3.
4.3 Receiving End-system
The receiving end-system implements the integrity
checking (IC) and redundancy management (RM). Frames
that are not in the interval [PSN ⊕ 1, PSN ⊕ 2] are dis-
carded by the IC, except in the case when the frame number
is 0. Frames may also be discarded in the RM because of
the “first valid wins” policy. Both these policies are imple-
mented in our model.
The automata for receiving end-system, given in Fig-
ure 5, is initially in the state NotRecd. If a valid packet
is received from the first channel, then it updates the pre-
vious sequence number (psn) by going through the state
RecdOne. A valid frame is similarly handled through the
state RecdTwo. Both these states are labeled as committed.
Therefore, time is not allowed to pass in this state and the
transition back to NotRecd is taken immediately. psnlb
BAG
t
Lmin
Figure 6. A system with two agents
and psnub are used to keep track of the interval bounds.
Upon receiving a 0, the system is reset via the state Reset.
We incorporate several variables to check for certain
cases of interest such as acceptance of a babbling frame,
resets, etc.:
1. chk: This variable is shared with the network channel
and is assigned 2 when it is discarded by the RM but
passes through the IC.
2. resetchk : This is a boolean variable that is set
whenever the receiving system resets.
3. babchk :A boolean variable that is set whenever a
babbling frame is accepted. Note that the babbling
frame is tracked by verifying if chk=3.
4. valid : This variable is also a boolean that is set
whenever the frame is accepted by entering one of the
states RecdOne or RecdTwo.
5 Analysis and Results
The semantics of the frame management depend on the
relationship between various parameters such as, actual la-
tency, the skew between reception of redundant frames, and
the time for hardware reset. Here, we consider two distinct
cases:
Let Lmax be the maximum latency of arrival of a frame,
Lmin the minimum latency, and SkewMax, the time be-
tween delivery of redundant frames. Consider the scenario
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NotRecd
Reset
RecdOne
RecdTwo
(fr!=psnlb)&&(fr!=psnub)
recd_two?
chk:=(chk2==1) && (fr!=psn)?2:chk
(fr!=psnlb)&&(fr!=psnub)
recd_one?
chk:=(chk1==1) && (fr!=psn)?2:chk
fr==0
recd_one?
babchk:=(chk1==3)?1:0
fr==0
recd_two?
babchk:=(chk2==3)?1:0
psnlb:=1,psnub:=2,resetchk:=1,rchk:=0,psn:=0
(fr==psnlb)||(fr==psnub)
recd_one?
babchk:=(chk1==3)?1:0,valid:=1
resetchk:=0,psnlb:=(fr<255)?fr+1:1,psnub:=(fr+2>255)?fr-253:fr+2,psn:=fr,valid:=0
(fr==psnlb)||(fr==psnub)
recd_two?
babchk:=(chk2==3)?1:0,valid:=1
resetchk:=0,psnlb:=(fr<255)?fr+1:1,psnub:=(fr+2>255)?fr-253:fr+2,psn:=fr,valid:=0
Figure 5. Timed Automata Model of the Receiving End-system
of frame arrivals as shown in Figure 6. Let us assume that
a frame was delivered at time t on the first channel. The
redundant frame on the other channel can arrive as late as
t+SkewMax and the successive frame on the first channel
may arrive as early as Lmin in the next BAG. Therefore if
BAG− t+Lmin > SkewMax, then, the redundant frame
will arrive before the successive frame on the first channel.
Since t can be as large as Lmax in the worst case, to require
that redundant frames arrive before the successive frame,
we should have BAG− Lmax + Lmin > SkewMax. We
now analyze the model based on this condition.
1. Case SkewMax < (Lmax + BAG− Lmin):
This situation may apply to many types of messages
such as those with real-time data. In this case, al-
though the frames arrive in-order, we would want to
test the behavior under transmission faults, network
babble and reset messages.
(a) A babbling frame is never accepted : The vari-
able babchk was used to verify this prop-
erty. The desired property is the expressed
by the CTL condition E<> (rs1.babchk &&
rs1.valid). This property was satisfied in the
model, and the following diagnostic trace was
generated: If one of the network babbles such
that the babbling frame number lies in [PSN ⊕
1, PSN ⊕ 2], then this gets accepted and in this
process, the legitimate frame from the other net-
work gets rejected even though it is delivered
successfully.
(b) A receiving end-system reset implies a trans-
mitting system reset: This was expressed us-
ing the condition, A[] rs1.Reset imply
rchk. The following counterexample was gen-
erated in this case: If a network babbles a reset
frame number, then that results in the receiving
end-system erroneously reseting.
2. Case SkewMax ≥ (Lmax + BAG− Lmin):
For certain kind of messages, such as those with mul-
timedia content, the skew may actually be longer than
Lmin + BAG−Lmax. In this case, it is possible that,
the redundant frames arrive after the next frame arrives
on the first channel. Therefore, apart from ensuring
that babbling frames are never accepted and no erro-
neous resets, we test whether a frame is ever dropped
when delivered to the receiver.
When model-checked, a counterexample was gener-
ated for all the three cases. We present the coun-
terexample that was generated when testing for the last
property. The counterexample for first two cases are
similar to those given above.
• If a valid and non-redundant frame is delivered,
then it is not discarded This property was ex-
pressed using the CTL condition A[] chk!=2.
When the faster of the two networks delivers suc-
cessive invalid and valid frames before the slower
network can deliver the first frame, the receiving
end-system accepts the second frame from the
faster network and considers the valid first frame
as invalid and discards it.
We note that although this scenario is mentioned
in the AFDX design document [3], it has not been
addressed there. Dropped frames could affect the
QoS and hence should be avoided. In the next
section, we show that a minor modification to the
original design can help avoid this problem and
thereby ensure good QoS.
6 Improving the Frame Management Design
The frame management design could be modified to be
handle network babbling and also not disregard valid frames
that arrive late. We suggest two changes to the design that
will help us achieve these goals.
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6.1 Integrating the IC and RM with a Pri-
ority Queue
The first suggestion for improving the frame manage-
ment is the introduction of a integrity check with queuing
module instead of the distinct IC and RM modules in the
original design. The modified design is presented in Figure
7. Listing 1 describes the action taken when a frame fr
with frame number frn is delivered to the module. The
main idea is that, whenever a frame is delivered such that
it is valid for that particular channel, it is enqueued. If that
particular frame is already present in the queue, it is veri-
fied for consistency. If a channel delivers a frame with the
same frame number twice, it is treated as network babble
and the frame ignored. Since the previously delivered frame
from the same channel could also be due to the network bab-
ble, we should delete it from the queue to avoid accepting
frames that are not legitimate.
In the Listing 1, we assume that enqueue and
isPresent are functions that are implemented.
enqueue is assumed to take the message and the
frame number as input and enqueue it in the queue ac-
cording to the priority. isPresent is assumed to check
whether a particular frame is already present in the queue
and return the frame if present else return null. The case
of resets i.e., frn=0 is treated in the next section. We also
assume that we have two counters, psn[ch],ch=1,2,
that keep a track of the previous sequence number of that
channel.
1: wait(fr)
2: if ((frn > 0) ∧ (frn ∈ [psn[ch] ⊕ 1, psn[ch] ⊕ 2])) then
3: if (isPresent(frn) = null) then
4: enqueue(fr)
5: psn[ch]← frn
6: else if (isPresent(frn) 6= fr) then
7: // Inconsistent frames
8: end if
9: else if (frn = psn[ch]) then
10: // Channel ch babbling
11: end if
Listing 1: Handling frames with the priority queue
Dequeuing the frames: Messages in the queue can be
dequeued and handed over to the application at hand. Every
time we enqueue an element, it can be timestamped and
dequeued either upon receipt of the redundant frame from
the other channel or after time SkewMax. If the redundant
frame fails to arrive, then, we would have to wait for the
successive frame to arrive on the channel, so that it can be
tested for babbling ( a wait of Lmax +BAG−Lmin). The
queue is also to be emptied after the frame 255 is received
to keep it from interfering with the priorities once the frame
number starts over from 1.
Compared to the modified design, where the additional
latency could be as high as Lmax +BAG−Lmin, the orig-
inal design introduces, at worst, a delay of of SkewMax
when the frame is dropped on the first channel. However,
despite higher latencies, the modified design may be pre-
ferred for implementation as it offers better data integrity
and QoS.
6.2 Handling Resets
One of the problems with the AFDX frame management
is that it is vulnerable to babbling resets. The IC works as
long as frame numbers are greater than 0, but accepts the
frame 0 and resets. The problem is that, with just two chan-
nels and one reset message, we cannot achieve tolerance to
both network babble and transmission loss: If only one re-
set message is received at the end-system, it could either be
due to network babble on one channel or due to transmis-
sion loss on the other.
One strategy to achieve tolerance to babbling, is to in-
crease the number of redundant channels. That way, a vot-
ing scheme [4] can be used to decide on resets. To achieve
tolerance to one channel babble, we would need at least
three channels. However, including more redundant chan-
nels adds a significant overhead and therefore not an attrac-
tive option for implementation.
An alternative to having more redundant channels, is to
send redundant messages on each of the channels. The idea
is that, instead of sending frame 0 once, we send two reset
messages (frame 0) on both the channels. The receiver re-
sets only when it gets at least one 0 frame from either of
the channels. This is described in Listing 2. It can easily be
seen that this modification makes the design tolerant to bab-
bling on one channel and one message loss due to transmis-
sion. The disadvantage here, when compared to adding an
extra channel, is the increased delay before the receiver re-
set. However, since there is no extra overhead, this scheme
may be preferred over adding an extra channel.
Analysis on the modified design: We modified the timed
automata models with the above suggestions and checked
for the desired properties. Only the reset property A[]
rs1.Reset imply rchk generated a counter example
when both the frames on one channel were dropped. Al-
though this is a possibility, the probability of this happening
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1: resetCounter[1]← 0
2: resetCounter[2]← 0
3: wait(fr)
4: if (frn = 0) then
5: resetCounter[ch]← resetCounter[ch] + 1
6: end if
7: if (resetCounter[1] ≥ 1) ∧ (resetCounter[2] ≥ 1) then
8: // reset
9: end if
Listing 2: Handling resets
in practice are extremely small.
6.3 Design Tradeoffs
We notice that there is a tradeoff between latency at the
receiver versus adding an extra channel: By increasing the
number of independent channels, we can reduce the latency
and by reducing the number of channels, we would have
to transmit multiple copies, and this results in increased la-
tency. Therefore the exact design choice would have to de-
pend on the application at hand. If the extra latency is ac-
ceptable, then we could do without an extra channel. How-
ever, many critical applications an extra channel would have
to be employed to achieve fault tolerance.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The AFDX is an implementation of the commercial
standard for avionics communication architecture, called
ARINC-664. It has been developed for providing reliable
and deterministic delivery of frames in a switched Ether-
net for avionics applications. To provide these guarantees,
frames are sent over redundant links that have a bounded
latency and bandwidth. The frame management is respon-
sible for managing the redundancy and checking integrity
of frames before handing it to the application. The frame
management also aims to achieve tolerance to faults such as
transmission errors and network babbling. In this work, we
have developed a formal model of the AFDX frame man-
agement using a network of timed automata. From our
analysis, we have uncovered that the design is vulnerable
to babbling resets and dropping of frames. To address these
issues, we have proposed integrating the redundancy man-
agement and integrity checking with the help of a priority
queue, and duplication of reset message on each channel.
These modifications are relatively simple to incorporate into
the original design and help achieve tolerance to channel
babble and a better QoS.
7.1 Testing AFDX Implementations
As future work, we propose to generate test suites based
on the UPPAAL model we have developed. Testing AFDX
implementations would involve injecting faults in the net-
work as per the automata model and observing for changes
registered at the receiving end-system. The faults injected
in the network would then have to be controlled and the be-
havior observed for possibilities of different errors, includ-
ing multiple instances of the same error and simultaneous
occurrence of distinct types of errors. Online testing based
on UPPAAL models have been developed [11] and we hope
to adapt it for generating tests for our models.
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